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Residence Requirements for Voting
in Presidential Elections
The Supreme Court has described the right to vote as the right "preservative of other basic civil and political rights,"' and has declared that
"any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative
government."2 Nevertheless, while recent judicial decisions and congressional enactments4 have reflected an increasing national concern
with infringements on the right to vote, the plight of what is probably
the largest class of disenfranchised citizens in America today-the
"movers" 5-has been virtually ignored.
Every four years, millions of American citizens are precluded from
voting for President and Vice-President merely because they have
changed their place of residence. Virtually every state, by maintaining
state and local residence requirements, disenfranchises large segments
of the electorate in every presidential election. In terms of absolute
numbers, the effects of these residence requirements have been dramatic. John Kennedy defeated Richard Nixon by barely 100,000 votes 6
in 1960, while between five and eight million 7 otherwise qualified voters
were made ineligible to vote for failure to satisfy residence requirements. In the 1968 election,8 estimates of disenfranchisement due to

I

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 856,
870 (1886).
2 Reynolds v. Sims, 877 US. 588, 555 (1964); accord, Moore v. Ogilvie, 894 U.S. 814,
818 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 583 U.S. 663, 667 (1966); see Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, at 17 (1964), in which Black, J., stated that "[n]o right is more precious in a free country than [the right to vote];" Williams v. Rhodes, 893 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).
3 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School District, 895 US. 621 (1969); Moore v. Ogilvie,
894 U.S. 814, 818 (1969); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs., 894 U.S. 802 (1969);
Williams v. Rhodes, 893 U.S. 23 (1968); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
4 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 et seq. (Supp. I, 1964).
5 Hearings on Nomination and Election of Presidentand Vice President and Qualifications for Voting Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th cong., 1st Sess. at 471 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961
Hearings]. See notes 7, 9 infra.
0 Kennedy received 84,226,925 votes and Nixon received 84,108,662 votes, resulting in
a margin of victory of 118,268 votes. 1961 WoaL.D ALMANAC 240.
7 Due to difficulties in determining the number of persons disenfranchised by state
and local residence requirements, the estimates vary considerably for any presidential
election. The most reliable estimates for the 1960 election state that eight milion were
disenfranchised. 1961 Hearings at 467, 849; 110 CONG. RFc. 14662 (1964) (remarks of Mr.
Schwengel). This represents between 4% and 8% of the potential electorate.
8 In the 1968 election, Nixon received 81,783,783 votes to Humphrey's 81,271,839, resuiting in a margin of victory of 511,944 votes. 1970 WoRm ALMANAC 365.
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state and local residence requirements ranged from five to eight million.9
The constantly increasing mobility of our nation in the twentieth
century,10 in conjunction with residence requirements for voting, has
created a new class of disenfranchised Americans." This "new class"
includes a highly disproportionate number of young 12 and black' 3
voters, who, while representing only thirty per cent of the voting age
population, constitute approximately fifty-five per cent of those precluded from voting by these requirements. The disenfranchisement of
these traditionally Democratic voters 4 has significant political implica9 Estimates of disenfranchisement in the 1968 election averaged at about five million.
The Gallup Poll of Dec. 11, 1968 estimated five million; the Library of Congress estimated five to eight million, 115 CONG. REc. S2113 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1969); and the
Bureau of Census estimated that 5.5 million were disenfranchised in the 1968 presidential
election as a result of residence requirements, 115 CONG. REC. H12156 (daily ed. Dec. 11,
1969).
10 Geographic mobility has increased at a comparatively steady rate in every decade
since 1900. Schmidhauser, Residency Requirements for Voting and the Tensions of a
Mobile Society, 61 MicH. L. REv. 823, 824 (1968); see Note, Federal Elections-The Disenfranchising Residence Requirement, U. ILL.L.F. 101, 102 (1962).
In 1968, 86,608,000 p~rsons over one year of age, constituting 18.8% of the population,
changed their place of residence. Of these persons, some 22,960,000 (11.8% of the population) moved within the same county; 6,607,000 (3.4%) moved from one county to another
within the same state; and 7,085,000 (3.6%) moved from one state to another. U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, MOBILITY STATUS OF THE POPULATION, BY CHARAcTERIsTICS: 1967 and 1968,
in STATiSTICAL ABSmRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, Table No. 88 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
MOBILITY STATUS OF THE POPULATION].

11 113 CONG. REC. 14041 (1967) (The Political Process in America, a speech by President Lyndon Johnson).

12

Age Group

Per Cent of
Voting Age
Population

Per Cent
of Movers

20-29
80-49
over 50

22
38
40

45
88
22

Adapted from MOBILITY STATUS OF THE POPULATION.
I' 18.8% of white voters move each year, while 20.5% of black voters move each year.
See MOBILITY STATUS OF THE POPULATION.
14 In the 1968 election, for example, these groups voted as follows:

Classification
By Age
20-29
80-49
over 50
By Color
black voters
white voters

Per Cent Voting
for Nixon

Per Cent Voting
for Humphrey

38
41
47

47
44
41

12
47

85
88
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tions.15 In short, as a result of increasing mobility, residence require-

ments for voting in presidential elections have created a crisis that has
16
now "reached the dimensions of a serious national injustice."
This comment will analyze what has been done in the past and what
can be done in the future by the states, the Supreme Court, and the
Congress to eliminate the disenfranchising effects of residence re17
quirements for voting in presidential elections.
I. THE STATES
Article II, section 1 of the Constitution 8 reserved the power of
determining voter qualifications for national elections to the states.' 9
Adapted from Gallup Poll, Dec. 8, 1968.
Moreover, while mobility among various occupational groups is relatively constant,
Gallup Poll, June 7, 1957, the rate of mobility among farmers, who voted heavily for
Nixon in 1968 (farmers cast 51% of their votes for Nixon and only 29% for Humphrey);
Gallup Poll, Dec. 8, 1968, is far below that of other occupational groups. Gallup Poll, June

7, 1957.
As a result, while 43.4% of the population voted for Nixon in 1968 and 43.0% voted
for Humphrey, Gallup Poll, Dec. 8, 1968 of the disenfranchised movers, approximately
38% would have voted for Nixon and 47% would have voted for Humphrey. (This
approximation is adjusted for voting participation differences among the various groups).
15 It is also important to note that most Americans who move do so in order to achieve
economic advancement. Over three-fourths of all males who move from one state to another do so for job-related reasons. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION
REPOI Ts, (Series P-20, No. 154, 1966). Generally, migrants have achieved higher income
and greater employment than those who have not moved. See Lansing and Morgan, The
Effect of Geographical Mobility on Income, II J. Hum. Rxs. 449, 460 (1967); Saben,
Geographic Mobility and Employment Status, 87 MONTHLY LABOR REv. 873-81 (1964). In
1960, for example, General Electric reported that 6% of its executive personnel were disenfranchised because of interstate moves. 1961 Hearings at 35.
16 107 CoNG. Rxc. 1008 (1961).
37 It should be noted that residence requirements are separate and distinct from
registration requirements. Residence requirements refer to the length of time a person
must have resided in a state, county or precinct before he is qualified to vote, while registration requirements relate to the time at which qualified voters must register in order
to vote. See note 114 infra. The problems relating exclusively to registration requirements are beyond the purview of this comment.
18 "[E]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a
Number of Electors ...."
19 This section has not retained its original interpretation. It was the hope of the
founders that the electoral college would contain the nation's leaders. By 1796, however,
the members of the electoral college had become political puppets and, as the states
adopted the popular vote as the method of selecting electors, the voting populace found
itself, in essence, voting directly for the President and Vice-President. Notwithstanding
this change of philosophy, the states still control the qualifications of voters. Comment,
Federal Elections-The Disenfranchising Residence Requirement, U. Iu..L.F. 101, 102
(1962); see A. CORWIN, COURT OvER CoNsTrruTioN 89-90 (1938). The states' control over
voter qualifications, however, has been effectively limited in certain areas by constitutional
amendments. For example, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has
been utilized as a means of restricting state control over the electoral process. See, e.g.,
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It was on the basis of this authority that the states first adopted residence requirements for voting. These requirements are of two distinct forms: state residence requirements, which affect interstatemovers;
and county and precinct requirements, which involve intrastatemovers.
A. The Interstate Mover
State residence requirements which were adopted in the nineteenth
century by all the states remained essentially unchanged until 1953.
At that time five states required two years residence within the state,
thirty-two states required one year, and eleven states required six
months. By 1953, however, the states recognized that the distinct
characteristics of presidential elections 20 made the application of such
stringent residence requirements inappropriate, 21 and they began
gradually to liberalize their residence requirements for presidential
elections.
1. Connecticut's Absentee Approach. The movement toward protecting disenfranchised voters in presidential elections began with
Connecticut's passage, in 1953, of a statute extending the state's absentee
balloting privilege to former residents. 22 The Connecticut statute permitted a voter, upon leaving Connecticut and taking up residence
in another state, to cast an absentee ballot in Connecticut until he had
complied with the requirements for voting in the new state. This
statute was applicable only to presidential elections, and the right to
cast an absentee ballot was limited to twenty-four months. Since 1953
eight other states have followed the Connecticut approach.23
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 883 US. 663 (1966) (eliminating the poll tax);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (restricting the use of literacy tests); cf. Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (reapportionment). In addition, the fifteenth amendment
barred the states from denying the right to vote to blacks; the nineteenth amendment
forbade the states to deprive women of the right to vote; and the twenty-fourth amendment eliminated the poll tax in primaries and all other elections. See Kirby, Limitations
on the Power of State Legislatures Over PresidentialElections, 27 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
495, 496-7 (1962). Thus, the power granted to the states by article II, section 1 is far from
unlimited.
20 Some of the characteristics of presidential elections which distinguish them from all
other types of elections are as follows: the President represents all the people, he does
not serve merely one geographic area; local issues are relatively insignificant in presidential elections; and, lastly, increased press, television, and radio coverage of Presidential
elections enable a citizen to inform himself of national issues no matter where he resides.
21 For example, the National Institute of Municipal Clerks, in 1953, urged the national government to act to make it possible for intrastate movers to vote in presidential
elections. See Ogul, Residence Requirements as Barriers to Voting in Presidential Elections, 3 Mw. J. POL. ScI. 254, 256 (1959).
22 CONN. Gm. STAT. ANN. § 9-158 (1958).
23 ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-171 (Supp. 1967) (fifteen month period in which the
former resident may vote absentee); MIcH. Comp. LAws § 168.758a (1967) (the former
resident may vote absentee until he is qualified to vote under the laws of his new state
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The absentee method enables all otherwise qualified citizens to vote
for President and Vice-President. The uniform adoption of this method
would eliminate the disenfranchising effects of residence requirements
on interstate movers. There are, however, three weaknesses in the
absentee approach. First, new residents might postpone acquiring
familiarity with local political conditions.2 4 This is not a decisive difficulty, since it is generally agreed that local issues are of little consequence in presidential elections. 25 Secondly, some voters might be
discouraged by burdensome absentee ballot procedures. 26 A third
defect in this approach arises out of the fact that voting qualifications
are commonly established in state constitutions. One qualification
common to almost every state is that one must be a resident of the
state in order to vote. In order to provide absentee voting for former
residents, most states would be required to amend their constitutions,
a time-consuming approach, involving considerable political difficulties.2 7 Some authorities2 8 have suggested that this problem can be circumvented by adopting a strict construction of article II, section 1.29
Since this section grants the power to regulate voting qualifications to
of residence); NJ. CONST. art. 2, § 3 (Supp. 1967), N.J.

STAT. ANN. § 19:58-2-3 (Supp.
1967) (until qualified in new state); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-403 (Supp. 1969) (until qualified); TEx. ELECTION CODE art. 5.056 (Supp. 1967) (twenty-four month period); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, § 67 (1967) (fifteen month period); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 6.18 (1967) (twentyfour month period); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 22-118.3(k)(6) (Supp. 1965) (until qualified in new
state.
24 1961 Hearings at 854.
25 See text at notes 100-2 infra.
26 1961 Hearings at 854. Connecticut's

procedures are typical. In order to cast a
special absentee ballot, the applicant must first apply, in writing, to the town clerk of
his former residence. The voter must swear to the affidavit printed on the ballot envelope
before an election official of the new state. He then returns the ballot to the town clerk
of his former residence. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-158, 9-160-2 (1958). See also NJ. STAT.
ANN. §§ 19:58-9, 17, 22, (Supp. 1967); TMc. ELECTION CODE art. 5.05b (Supp. 1967); VT.

ANN. §§ tit. 17, 67, 121, 123, 136-9 (1967). Under these statutes the applicant for
an absentee ballot must frequently appear in person, a burden which many potential
voters might be unwilling to bear.
27 See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, PROGRAM OF SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 77
(1962); 1961 Hearings at 37.
In 1960 the New Jersey Assembly passed a bill which would allow an otherwise qualified voter who had moved out of New Jersey to vote in presidential elections by absentee
ballot if he was not yet qualified in his new state. Governor Meyner vetoed the bill on
grounds of unconstitutionality, relying on provisions of the New Jersey Constitution
which limited voting in all elections to persons residing within the state at the time. 1961
Hearings at 38. Eventually New Jersey did adopt absentee voting by former residents
(NJ. STAT. ANN. § 19:58-2 (Supp. 1967)), but not until after the Constitution was amended
(NJ. CONST. art. 2, § 3 (Supp. 1967)).
STAT.

28 See, e.g., Kirby, Limitations on the Power of State Legislatures Over Presidential
Elections, 27 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 495, 500-4 (1962); COUNCIL OF STATE GoVRNMNS,
PROGRAM OF SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 77 (1962); 1961 Hearings at 37-38.
29 See note 18 supra.
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the state legislatures, a strict construction of this section would enable
these legislatures to establish voter qualifications without regard to their
30
state constitutions.
2. Wisconsin's "New Resident" Approach. In 1954 Wisconsin de-

vised an alternative method of protecting the interstate mover,3 1 permitting a new resident to vote for President and Vice-President if he
would have been qualified to vote in the state of his prior residence
had he remained there until the election. Since 1954, twelve other
states have adopted this approach. Three states, 32 following Wisconsin,
have eliminated their residence requirements completely, while nine
other states8 3 have adopted special residence requirements, for presidential elections only, which are significantly shorter than their
normal requirements.
The mechanics of voting under these statutes, while more complex
than standard voting procedures, are considerably less burdensome on
the voter than the absentee approach. 34 Moreover, the problem of
30 See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, at 34 (1892), in which the Supreme Court
quoted with approval the following statement made in 1874 by a Senate Committee:
The appointment of these electors is thus placed absolutely and wholly with the
This power is conferred upon the legislatures
legislatures of the several States ....
of the States by the Constitution of the United States, and cannot be taken from
them or modified by their State constitutions any more than can their power to elect
Senators of the United States. Whatever provisions may be made by statute, or by
state constitution, to choose electors by the people, there is no doubt of the right of
the legislature to resume the power at any time, for it can neither be taken away or
abdicated.
For a full discussion of this possibility see Kirby, supra note 28, at 500-4.
31 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 6.15 (1967).
32 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.031 (Supp. 1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16-16-17 (Supp. 1967);

OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3504.01 (Baldwin 1960).
33 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-172 (Supp. 1967) (special requirement of sixty days);
CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 751 (West Supp. 1967), CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1 (54 days); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 4401 (Supp. 1968) (three months); GA. CONST. art. II, § 703 (Supp.
STAT. ch. 46, § 3-1
1968), GA. CODE ANN. § 34-602 (Supp. 1968) (thirty days); ILL. Rv.
(Smith-Hurd 1965) (sixty days); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18:1391 et seq. (1969) (sixty days),
MICH. Comp. LAws § 168.758a(l) (1967) (thirty days); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 65:la (Supp.
1969) (thirty days); TEx. CONsT. art. VI, § 2a (Supp. 1967), Txx. ELECTION CODE art. 505a
(Supp. 1967) (sixty days).
34 The procedures followed in Wisconsin are typical. The new resident need not

register to vote, but he must apply to the proper municipal clerk either in person or in
writing at any time prior to the election. The applicant must swear to an affadavit and
must complete a card saying that he intends to vote for President and Vice-President in
Wisconsin and that his voting privileges should be cancelled at his previous residence.
The municipal clerk then forwards the card to the proper officials of the state of former
residence and requests a certificate from that official certifying to the fact that the applicant would have been qualified to vote in his former state had he not moved. When
the municipal clerk receives this certification, he notifies the applicant that he may vote.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 6.15 (1969). Under these procedures the burden on the applicant is
slight, for the state handles most of the correspondence itself. See also ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 46, § 21-1.01 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 16-16-18, 19, 21, 22 (Supp. 1967); TEX. ELECTION CODE art. 5.05a (Supp. 1967).
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amending state constitutions, inherent in the absentee approach, 35 is
avoided. When the Wisconsin method is used only to shorten normal
residence requirements, however, certain new residents will still be
precluded from voting. And by requiring that the new resident must
have been qualified to vote in his prior state of residence, this approach
does not enfranchise those new residents who were not qualified to
vote in their prior state of residence. 36
3. The Uniform Law Approach. The most recent attempt to aid

the interstate mover differed from the Wisconsin method in that it
eliminated the requirement that the new resident must have been
qualified in his prior state. This approach was formulated in 196237
by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in its
Uniform Voting by New Residents in Presidential Elections Act. 38 The
Uniform Act has been adopted in seven states, four 39 of which have
eliminated their normal requirements entirely for presidential elections, and three4 0 of which have shortened their normal requirements.
In addition, another eleven states, while not formally adopting the
Uniform Act, have enacted similar legislation. Of these eleven states,
two 41 have completely eliminated their requirements, and nine42 have

35 This problem is discussed in text at notes 27-30 supra.
36 There are essentially two types of situations in which a new resident would be
qualified in his new state but not in his prior state: (1) when the new resident moves
from a state with an age qualification which is higher than that in the state to which
he has moved, and where he is old enough to satisfy his new state's requirement, but
not his old state's requirement; (2) when the new resident had not lived in the prior state
long enough to fulfill that state's residency requirement.
37 In its initial consideration of the voting problems of interstate movers, in 1952, the
Council of State Governments did not deal with positive legislation, but instead chose to
attack possible federal intervention. In 1956, the Council endorsed Connecticut's absentee
method, and then, in 1962, after considering the advantages and disadvantages of both
the Connecticut and Wisconsin approaches, it decided to pattern its Uniform Act on the
Wisconsin approach. Uniform Voting by New Residents in Presidential Elections Act,
Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9C U.L.A. 200-1 (Supp. 1967); see Schmidhauser, Residency Requirements for Voting and the Tensions of a Mobile Society, 61 Micn. L. R v.
823, 831 (1961).
38 Uniform Voting by New Residents in Presidential Elections Act, 9C U.L.A.
202 (Supp. 1967).
39 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 21, §§ 281-319 (1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 208.21 et seq.
(1962); NEB. Rxv. STAT. §§ 32-1301 to 32-1314 (Supp. 1963); OKLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 601 to
614 (Supp. 1967).
40 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-163a to 9-163 (1958) (sixty days); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 34-408 (1963); IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 2 (Supp. 1967) (sixty days); MD. ANN. CODE art.
33, §§ 288-301 (forty-five days).
41 ALAsKA STAT. §§ 15.15.012, 15.15.014 (Michie Supp. 1969); ORE. ELECTION LAWS
§ 247A10 (Supp. 1965).
42 COLO. CONST. art. 7, § 2; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49-24-1 (amended April 23,
1969), (two months); KAN. CONsr. art. 5, § 1 (1964); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1801 (1964)
(forty-five days); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 51, §§ IA-lB (Supp. 1966) (thirty-one days);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 111.063 (Vernon rev. 1966) (sixty days); NJ. CONsT. art. 2, § 3 (Supp.

366
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43

shortened them.
Presently, state residence requirements, while less restrictive than

they were seventeen years ago, still impose significant restrictions on an
interstate mover's eligibility to vote in presidential elections. Thirtyfour4 4 states have modified their residence requirements through the

adoption of one or more 45 of the above methods. 46 Table I illustrates
TABLE I
INTERSTATE RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS

Number of States
1953"

1970

2 years
1 year
6 months
3 months (or ninety days)
2 months (or sixty days)
54 days
45 days
40 days
81 days
80 days

5
82
11

1
15
3
3
10
1
2
1
1
4

no requirement
absentee method

0
0

10
9

Length of Requirement

Does not include Alaska, Hawaii, or the District of Columbia.

the changes that have been made and sets forth the present breakdown
of residence requirements in the fifty states and the District of Columbia. Table I also indicates the nonuniform character of these require1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:58-2 (Supp. 1967) (forty days); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-17-2, 3-17-3
(Supp. 1967) (thirty days); N.Y. ELECrTION LAw § 341 (1964) (ninety days); N.C. CONSr.
art. 6, § 2 (1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-56 (Supp. 1967) (sixty days); WAs- Rgv. CODE
ANN. tit. 29, § 68.066 (Supp. 1967) (sixty days).
43 The advantages and disadvantages of this approach are almost identical to those
of the Wisconsin approach. See text at notes 34-36 supra. The only significant difference
is that the Uniform Act does not require that the new resident have been qualified in
his prior state.
44 See notes 22-23, 81-33, 41-43 supra.
45 Arizona, Connecticut, Michigan, New Jersey, Texas, and Wisconsin have adopted
both the absentee and one of the new resident approaches.
46 The District of Columbia (one year) and the following states have not modified
their residence requirements: Alabama (one year); Arkansas (one year); Hawaii (one
year); Indiana (six months); Iowa (six months); Kentucky (one year); Mississippi (two
years); Montana (one year); Nevada (six months); Pennsylvania (ninety days); Rhode
Island (one year); South Carolina (one year); South Dakota (one year); Utah (one year)
(Utah is presently considering a proposed amendment to article IV, § 2 of the Utah
Constitution, which would establish a maximum thirty-day requirement for presidential
elections, UTAH LAWS, 1969, S. J. Res. no. 3); Virginia (one year); and West Virginia (one
year). In addition, Tennessee (one year), Vermont (one year), and Wyoming (one year),
while adopting the absentee approach, have not modified their requirements for new
residents.
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ments. The great variation in the present laws creates confusion and
leads to discrimination between citizens of different states. For example, a citizen moving from Maine to Rhode Island loses his right to
vote for President and Vice-President for a full year, while a citizen
moving from Rhode Island to Maine may vote immediately; and a
citizen moving from Vermont to Rhode Island does not lose his right
to vote, while a citizen moving from Rhode Island to Vermont loses
it for a year.
B. The Intrastate Mover
In addition to state requirements, most states also maintain county
and precinct residence requirements which serve to disenfranchise the
intrastate mover. The states have made virtually no attempt to reduce
these county and precinct requirements, and confusion and discrimination among intrastate movers has resulted.4 7 Table II indicates the
TABLE II
INTRASTATE

RESmENCE REQUIREMENTS

Number of States
County
Length of Requirement
1 year
6
5
4
3
2

months
months
months
months (or 90 days)
months (or 60 days)

54
45
40
30
20
15
10
no

days
days
days
days
days
days
days
requirement

median requirement (in days)

195648

Precinct

197049

1956*

1970

3

0

1

1

13
1
3
8
5

13
0
1
10
8

1
0
2
2
2

2
0
0
4
3

0
0
2
4
1
0
0

0
0
3

1
1
1
16
1

8

0
0
0
9

1
0
1
17
0
1
3
17

16

105

84

32

32

7

1
4

* Does not include Alaska, Hawaii, or the District of Columbia.
47 For example, a voter may be precluded from voting in a presidential election
merely because he has moved "across the street" (when such a move involves a change
of county or precinct). See 1961 Hearingsat 34, 36, 471. Moreover, the lack of consistency
between state and local requirements occasionally results in situations in which an intrastate mover is precluded from voting, while an interstate mover, moving at the same
time and into the same county or precinct, is allowed to vote.
48 The 1956 requirements, both county and precinct, were adapted from Goldman,

Move-Lose Your Vote, 45 NAT'L. MUNIC. REV. 6, 7 (1956).
49 The 1969 requirements, both county and precinct, were adapted from 115 CONG.

REc. S5745 (daily ed. May 13, 1969) (Bureau of the Census study).
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absence of change in local requirements, and it sets forth the present
county and precinct requirements.
Two possible approaches might be taken to protect intrastate movers.5 0 First, the states may allow intrastate movers to vote absentee in
the original precinct or county until qualified in the new place of
residence. A number of states have formulated such "return-to-vote"
clauses for intracounty movers, 51 and a few have applied these clauses
to intercounty movers. 52 Alternatively, statewide transfer provisions
comparable to the Uniform Act approach for interstate movers may be
adopted, but this method is rarely used. 53
With respect to their residence requirements for voting in presidential elections, the states have not satisfactorily confronted the problems
of the interstate and intrastate movers in our increasingly mobile society. At both the state and local levels, the movement toward eliminating
these requirements has been uneven and incomplete. Although the
states have liberalized their residence requirements over the past seventeen years, these requirements still effectively disenfranchise millions of
otherwise qualified voters.
II. THE

SUPREME

COURT

The power conferred on the states by article II, section 1, of the
Constitution to regulate elections is limited by the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 4 The central issue in any action
challenging the constitutionality of residence requirements for voting
in presidential elections is whether such restrictions on the electorate
are valid under the equal protection clause. A subsidiary procedural
issue will also confront the Court in most actions challenging the constitutionality of these requirements. If the election in which the plain50 In addition to these possibilities, two others have been suggested. First, the states
might adopt statewide registration procedures, thus eliminating registration problems
created by intrastate moves. Second, a procedure of cooperation between counties or
precincts might be initiated. Such a procedure would enable cross-checking of registration lists in order to prevent fraud. Neither of these alternatives is immediately feasible,
however, since they would entail extensive revision of state election laws. See Note, The

Impact and Constitutionality of Voter Residence Requirements as Applied to Certain
Intrastate Movers, 43 IND. Lj. 901, 910-1 (1968).
51 See, e.g., IuL. REv. STAT. ch. 46, §§ 5-2, 5-23 (1965); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 118-250, 118380 (1966); VA. CODE ANN. § 24-17 (Supp. 1966).
52, See, e.g., CAL. CONsT. art. 2, § 1 (1953); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 4401 (Supp. 1968);
OHio )v. CODE § 3503.01 (1960); MINN. CONsT. art. 7, § 1 (Supp. 1969), MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 207-02 (1962).
53 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-29 (1963).
54 See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966); Lassiter v. Northhampton County Ed. of Elections,

360 U.S. 45, 50-51 (1959).
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tiffs sought to vote is conducted prior to the Court's decision, the
question of mootness arises.
A.

The Procedural Issue: Mootness

The question of mootness will frequently arise in actions challenging
the constitutionality of residence requirements from the combination
of three factors: first, the plantiff cannot institute the action until he
has become a resident of the state and has been precluded from register-

ing; 55 second, the litigation, particularly if an appeal is involved, probably will not be concluded until the election has already been conducted;56 third, the relief typically sought in such cases (injunctive relief
aimed at allowing the plaintiff to vote) 57 cannot be granted once the
55 The Supreme Court has consistently held that it will not grant an advisory decree
upon a hypothetical state of facts, see, e.g., Golden v. Zwickler, 394 US. 103, 110 (1969);
Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419, 443 (1938); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S.
288, 324 (1936); and the Court has ruled that it will not decide an action unless there
is an "actual controversy," see, e.g., Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202, 203 (1958); United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 US. 75, 89 (1947); Coffman v. Breeze Corps., 323 U.S.
316, 324 (1945). Furthermore, the courts have explicitly held that there must be no uncertainty that the asserted right will be invaded, see, e.g., Johnson v. Interstate Transit
Lines, 163 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1947); and that the mere possibility that a person may at
some future time be adversely affected by the provisions of a statute, or by the acts of
government officials, does not give rise to a justiciable case until an actual, concrete controversy occurs, see, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); West v. Bank of Commerce
& Trusts, 153 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1946); Walker v. First Trust & Savings Bank, 12 F.2d
896 (8th Cir. 1926). In International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Boyd,
347 U.S. 222 (1954), an action was brought for both injunctive and declarative relief to
prevent immigration officials from construing the Immigration and Nationality Act in a
particular manner. The Court dismissed the action for want of a "case or controversy"
since the sanctions of the statute had not yet been set in motion against the plaintiffs,
even though it was virtually certain that the sanctions would be applied in the near
future. On the basis of these cases it is dear that an action challenging the constitutionality of residence requirements cannot be instituted until the plaintiff has at least
become a resident of the state.
56 In his dissent in Hall v. Beals, 90 S. Ct. 200, 202 (1969), Justice Brennan suggests
two possible methods of hastening the litigation process in Cases challenging the constitutionality of residence requirements for voting. First, he suggests that such cases might
be given "preferred calandar position." Second, he suggests that a "waiver of the requirement of exhaustion of remedies" might enable the case to be instituted as soon as
the new resident enters the state. Such a waiver is usually permitted when the cause of
action is pleaded under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964); see, e.g., King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 312 (1968); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1963); McNeese v.
Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 671 (1962); but see, e.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S.
167 (1959) (waiver denied until the state court could clarify the challenged statute). Since
an action to declare a state's residence requirement unconstitutional can be brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, waiver of the requirement of exhaustion of remedies would be
allowed in a case brought under this statute since there is no question of clarification
involved. It is uncertain, however, whether preferred calandar position and waiver of
the requirement of exhaustion of remedies would enable the litigation process to condude prior to the election.
57 Such relief typically consists of (1) a writ of mandamus compelling the election

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 37:359

election has taken place. 5 The application of traditional standards of
mootness would require a dismissal of the action.59 Nevertheless, in
analogous situations the Supreme Court has decided otherwise moot
cases on the grounds that the problem is "capable of repetition, yet
evading review."'0° In Moore v. Ogilvie,61 the Court rejected a claim of
mootness in a case challenging the constitutionality of Illinois' nominating procedure for candidates for the offices of President and VicePresident. The Court rejected the argument that the case was moot
because the election had been held and stated that
while the 1968 election is over, the burden . . . placed on the

nomination of nominees.., remains and controls future elections,
as long as Illinois maintains her present system, as she has done
since 1935. The problem is therefore "capable of repetition, yet
evading review" . . . 62
officials to register the plaintiffs; and (2) an injunction restraining the enforcement and
operation of the challenged residence requirement.
58 This problem would be avoided if the plaintiff claimed money damages, since the right
to such damages does not expire with the happening of the election. The right to money
damages in cases involving the loss of the right to vote is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4),
and has been consistently recognized by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939). Moreover, the Court has decided
cases involving money damages long after the contested election has been conducted. See,
e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (a "white primary" law was declared unconstitutional, and the plaintiff recovered $5,000 in damages for loss of his right to vote
three and one-half years after the election); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (a
"white primary" law was declared unconstitutional, and the plaintiff recovered $5,000
two and one-half years after the election); Myers v. Anderson, 288 U.S. 868 (1915) (Maryland's grandfather clause was declared unconstitutional, and the plaintiff received damages six years after the election). Thus, it is dear that if the action challenging residence
requirements was brought for money damages the mootness problem would be eliminated.
59 In Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895), the Court dismissed on grounds of mootness
an action seeking to enjoin allegedly unreasonable registration procedures that had been
adopted for a special election. The basis for this dismissal rested upon the fact that the
election had taken place prior to the Court's decision. The Court declared that "when,
pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower court, and without any fault of the
defendant, an event occurs which renders it impossible for this court, if it should decide
the case in favor of the plaintiff, to grant him any effectual relief whatever, the court
will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will dismiss the appeal." Id. at 658. Accord,
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 504 (1961); St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 42
(1948); Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 US. 740, 746
(1942); Richardson v. McChesney, 218 US. 487 (1910); Tennessee v. Condon, 189 US. 64
(1908). For an extensive judicial analysis of mootness, see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 US.
288, 346-56 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
40 Accord, Southern Pacific Terminal
Co. v. ICC, 219 US. 498, 515 (1911); United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 308 (1897); see, eg., NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416 (1947); NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 803 U.S. 261 (1938).
61 394 US. 814 (1969).
62 Id. at 816; see Gray v. Sanders, 872 U.S. 368 (1963), in which the Supreme Court
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On the basis of Moore, it would seem that an action challenging a
state's residence requirements should not be dismissed on grounds of
mootness merely because the election in which the plaintiffs sought to
vote has taken place prior to the Court's decision. 63
B. The Substantive Issue: Constitutionality
In Hall v. Beals, 4 the United States District Court for Colorado held
that the imposition of residence requirements for voting is a constitutional exercise of the power conferred on the states by article II,
section 1 of the Constitution. In reaching this conclusion, the court
declared that
the members of the Court recognize the unfairness and injustice
in depriving the plaintiffs of their vote. However, we are powerless
65
to remedy this since we must follow the law.

The "law" which the court felt bound to follow was the Supreme
Court's summary per curiam affirmance of the United States District
Court for Maryland's decision in Dreudingv. Devlin.6 6 In that case the
held that the completion of the particular election did not make the case moot when the
challenged "Act remains in force; and if the complaint were dismissed it would govern
future elections ....
" Id. at 876.
It should be noted that the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" standard does
not require that the problem be repetitive for the particular plaintiff. In Moore the
Court applied this standard even though the plaintiff did not allege that the operation
of the statute would affect him in the future. Thus, in a suit challenging the constitutionality of residence requirements, this standard is applicable even though the
plaintiff has fulfilled the requirement at the time of adjudication, and even though it is
unlikely that he will be injured by its future operation.
63 The injection of additional circumstances into the factual situation surrounding a
challenge to residence requirements, beyond the mere conduction of the election, might,
of course, render the action moot. In Hall v. Beals, 90 S. Ct. 200 (1969), this situation
was presented. In this action, Colorado's six month residence requirement for voting in
presidential elections, CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49-24-1 (1963), was challenged. This statute
was amended, however, after the election, but prior to the Court's decision (amended on
April 23, 1969 so as to require two months residence). Thus, while the Hall court noted
that "[t]he 1968 election is history, and it is now impossible to grant the appellants the
relief they sought in the District Court . . . ," it dismissed the action on grounds of
mootness not on the basis of these "considerations," but on the fact that Colorado had
amended its statute. Id. at 201. In considering the plaintiffs' challenge, the Court looked
to the statute as it stood after it was amended. Id. at 201; see, e.g., Thorpe v. Housing
Authority of the City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1968); Ziffrin, Inc. v. United States, 318
US. 73 (1943); Carpenter v. Wabash Ry. Co., 309 U.S. 23 (1940); United States v. Schooner
Peggy, I Cranch 103, 109 (1801). Since the plaintiffs would have been able to vote in the
1968 election if the amended statute had been in effect at that time, they had no interest
in challenging the statute as amended.
64 292 F. Supp. 610 (D. Colo. 1968), vacated as moot, 90 S. Ct. 200 (1969).
65 Id. at 615 n.8.
66 234 F. Supp. 721 (C.D. Md. 1964), aff'd mem., 380 U.S. 125 (1965).
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court held that the classification of the electorate created by the imposition of Maryland's one-year residence requirement satisfied the traditional test of constitutionality under the equal protection clause:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment safeguard is offended only if the
classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement
of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have
the fact that, in
acted within their constitutional power despite
67
practice, their laws result in some inequality.
After recognizing that the state's objectives in imposing residence requirements were to identify the voter, to protect against fraud, and to
68
insure that the voter will become a member of the community, the
court upheld the statute saying that the residence requirement was not
'6 9
"wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective[s]."
However, the "wholly irrelevant" standard is no longer the applicable
standard in determining whether classifications of the electorate are
permissible under the equal protection clause.
1. The "Compelling State Interest Test" and the Right to Vote.
The equal protection clause does not forbid all classifications of the
populace. Even classifications which result in inequality among various
segments of the population are permissible in certain circumstances.
Under the traditional standard, as applied in Dreuding,equal protection is denied only if the classification is not reasonably related to the
government's objectives. 70 In recent years, however, the Supreme Court
has employed an alternative standard, to be applied only in certain
circumstances, under which equal protection is denied unless the classification is necessary to promote "compelling state interests." If the
state's objective is not deemed "compelling" or if the means chosen
by the state to achieve a particular objective are not deemed "necessary," the classification in question will be held unconstitutional.
The "compelling state interest" doctrine has two branches. First,
The
classifications based on suspect criteria are subject to this doctrine.
72
71
Supreme Court has ruled that classifications based on race, religion,
866 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
68 234 F. Supp. at 723.
69 Id. at 725.
70 See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 866 U.S. 420, 425 (1961); Flemming v. Nestor, 363
U.S. 603 (1960); Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959); Kotch v. Board of River
Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220
U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
71 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499 (1954); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83, 100 (1943).
72 See Braunfeld v. Brown, 866 U.S. 599, 603 (1961).
67 McGowan v. Maryland,
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wealth, 73 or political beliefs 4 are unconstitutional unless necessitated
by compelling state interests. The second branch of this doctrine holds
that any classification which burdens the exercise of a constitutional
right is invalid under the equal protection clause unless shown to be
necessary to promote compelling state interests. "Constitutional right"
in the Supreme Court's usage includes not only those rights explicitly
granted by the Constitution, but also fundamental rights which are
protected by it.75 For example, in Bates v. Little Rock,76 a case involving
the constitutionally protected right of association, the Supreme Court
stated that "[w]here there is a significant encroachment upon personal
liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling."7 7 And in Shapiro v. Thompson,78 the Court,
after recognizing that the right to travel is constitutionally protected,
asserted that "any classification which serves to penalize the exercise
of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling
79
governmental interest, is unconstitutional."
While it has generally been held that the right to vote is not explicitly
granted by the Constitution,8 0 it is well established that the right to

vote is a fundamental right protected by the Consitution.8s And the
(poll tax).
74 See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 US. 23, 31 (1968) (election laws preventing minority
parties from being on ballot).
75 Some rights which, although not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, have
been held to be constitutionally protected are: the right to marital privacy, see Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); the right to travel, see, eg., United States v. Guest,
383 US. 745, 757-8 (1966); Ward v. Maryland, 79 US. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1871); the right
to associate freely and privately, see, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
76 361 US. 516 (1960).
77 Id. at 524; accord, Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigating Comm., 372 US. 539,
546 (1963).
78 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
79 Id. at 634 (emphasis in original); accord, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 US. 398, 463
(1963) and cases cited therein; see, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 US. 214, 216
(1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
The "compelling state interest" doctrine is essentially conclusory in nature. While its
boundaries remain undefined, the Court has attempted to give some content to the
standard in a series of cases in which it has been applied. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23, 31-34 (1968); NAACP v. Button, 371 US. 415, 438-43 (1963). This comment,
while recognizing the difficulties inherent in so problematic a doctrine, also recognizes
the importance the Court has attributed to this standard, and, therefore, will consider
its application to the question of residence requirements for voting.
80 See, e.g., Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959);
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 US. 277, 283 (1937); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 US. 542
(1875); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 177 (1874). But see, e.g., Smith v.
Allwright, 321 US. 649, 661-2 (1944); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 US. 78, 97 (1908).
81 See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 US. 23, 30-31 (1968); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US. 533, 561 (1964); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); United States v. Reese, 96 US. 214, 217-8 (1875).
73 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 US. 663, 668 (1966)
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Supreme Court has ruled that classifications impairing the right to
vote are valid only if necessary to promote compelling state interests.8 2
In Kramer v. Union Free School District,3 for instance, the Court
held that "if a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to some
. . . and denies the franchise to others, the Court must determine
whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state
interest."8 4
Residence requirements for voting in presidential elections would
therefore appear to be constitutional only if they are necessary to promote compelling state interests. Three state interests are commonly
urged as justifications for these requirements: "[t]o preserve the purity
of elections," "[t]o insure that the voter is, in fact, a member of the state
community," and "[a]dministrative reasons."8 5
(a) "To preserve the purity of elections." The states have a legitimate, and perhaps compelling, interest in identifying the voter and
protecting against "double-voting" and fraud. However, in order to
satisfy the compelling state interest standard, not only must the interest be compelling, but the means adopted to promote that interest
must be necessary. In Shapiro v. Thompson, 6 the Court ruled that the
use of residence requirements for receipt of welfare benefits as a safeguard against fraud was not necessary to promote a compelling state
interest because "less drastic means are available, and are employed, to
minimize that hazard."8 7 Other and less drastic means are also available
to protect against voting fraud. For example, voter identification today
can be facilitated by the use of drivers' licenses, credit cards, photographs, and fingerprints. States which have eliminated their residence
requirements have protected themselves against "double-voting" and
"colonization" by requiring certifications from the new resident's prior
election district, thereby ensuring local officials that the new resident
has not retained his registration in the prior district., Moreover, the
imposition of residence requirements does not effectively prevent fraud,
since, under most state statutes, a voter's qualifications, including dura82 See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 807
(1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 28, 31 (1968); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); United States v. State of Texas, 384 U.S. 155 (1966); Carrington v.
Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
83 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
84 Id. at 627. Accord, Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704 (1969); Hall v. Beals, 90
S. Ct. 200, 203 (1969) (dissenting opinion of Marshall, J.).
85 Brief for Appellee at 8-9, Hall v. Beals, 90 S. Ct. 200 (1969).
86 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
87 Id. at 637.
88 See note 34 supra.
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tional residency, are established by oath.
observed in his dissent in Hall:

9

As Justice Marshall aptly

[t]he nonresident, seeking to vote, can as easily falsely swear that
he has been a resident for a certain time, as he could falsely swear
that he is presently a resident. The requirement of the additional element to be sworn-the duration of residency-adds no
discernible protection against "dual-voting" or "colonization" by
voters willing to lie.90
Residence requirements are not necessary to promote the states'
interests in preserving "the purity of election," and, therefore, this
interest does not meet the requirements of the compelling state interest
standard.
The Supreme Court's decision in Carrington v. Rash91 raises additional constitutional questions concerning the use of residence requirements as a means of limiting the electorate to bona fide residents.
In Carrington the state argued that it could not be certain whether
military personnel residing in Texas had a genuine intent to become
bona fide residents. The state claimed that the administrative convenience of avoiding that difficult factual determination justified a
blanket exclusion of all servicemen. The Court, while recognizing that
the state had a right to restrict the vote to bona fide residents,9 2 held
that such a conclusive presumption against bona fide residency was
impermissible, and that "States may not casually deprive a class of
individuals of the vote because of some remote administrative benefit
to the State."9 3 While a state has a legitimate interest in protecting
the "purity" of its elections, it may not adopt a conclusive presumption,
such as a residence requirement, that all new residents are not bona
fide residents.94
(b) "To insure that the voter is, in fact, a member of the state
community." Since the Electoral College system makes the states and
not individual citizens the electors of President and Vice-President,
it is argued that the states may legislate to ensure that those voting
for its presidential electors are truly members of the state community.
89 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-4-17 (1963); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 11-4 (1968);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 34-807 (1963); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-410 (1964); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 20-2-11 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 24-74 (1969).
90 90 S.Ct. at 205 (dissenting opinion of Marshall, J.).
91 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
92 Id. at 91.
93 Id. at 96; accord, Hall v. Beals, 90 S. Ct. 200, 205 (1969) (dissenting opinion of
Marshall, J.); see Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 542 (1965).
94 See Hall v. Beals, 90 S. Ct. 200, 205 (1969) (dissenting opinion of Marshall, J.); cf.
United States v. Texas, 384 U.S. 155 (1966), aff'g 252 F. Supp. 234, 251 (W.D. Tex. 1966).
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The Supreme Court has held that the states have a right to require
their voters to be bona fide residents. 95 Two questions are posed by
the "bona fide resident" or "member of the community" doctrine:
(1) May the establishment of bona fide residency be conditioned on the
fulfillment of a durational residence requirement? (2) Are there any
compelling state interests, founded in this doctrine, which necessitate
the imposition of residence requirements?
The first question has been answered above in the negative. Whether
a new resident is a bona fide resident or merely a visitor is a question
of fact. The state must determine if a new resident has a genuine intent
to remain in the community. Through the imposition of residence
requirements the state avoids making this determination by assuming
that most new residents do not have the requisite intent. However,
the Supreme Court has held that a state may not exclude persons from
the franchise merely because of some remote administrative benefit
to the state. 96 Thus, a state may not deprive all new residents of the
vote in order to avoid making factual determinations as to whether
97
some of these new residents are not bona fide residents.
Even if the "community" argument were to satisfy the requirements
of Carrington,it would still have to satisfy the compelling state interest doctrine in order to justify the imposition of residence requirements. It is sometimes suggested that the state has a right to prevent
new residents from voting until they have had an opportunity to
inform themselves of national issues. This argument rests upon the
assumption that "long-time" residents are better informed of national
issues than are new residents. This assumption is of dubious validity.
Modem developments in the press, radio, and television have enabled
citizens to inform themselves of the issues involved in a presidential
election no matter where they reside. The fact that a voter moves
from one state or county to another does not mean that he is in any
way less informed of national issues. The argument that a state has an
95 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 625-6 (1969); Carrington
v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93-94 (1965); cf. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 US. 663
(1966); Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
In Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1941), the Court held that residence requirements
for voting in state elections were constitutional. However, the Court explicitly stated that
"[i]n this case no question arises as to the right to vote for electors of President and Vice
President, and no decision is made thereon." Id. at 633.
96 See note 93 supra.
97 In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the Supreme Court rejected an argument that residence requirements for welfare receipts were justified as means of objectively determining residence. The Court held that "[t]he residence requirement (requirement that welfare applicant be a bona fide resident) and the one-year waiting period
" Id. at 636.
requirement are distinct and independent ..
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interest in ensuring that new residents are informed of national issues
is thus unsupported, if not unsupportable.
The second purported state interest rests upon the somewhat doubtfu198 assumption that, even in presidential elections, a voter's "primary"
community is the state and not the nation. It is argued that a state
may deprive new residents of the vote until they have become familiar
with local attitudes and their interests are the same as those of "longtime" residents. In Carrington the Court rejected this argument because "'[flencing out' from the franchise a sector of the population

because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible." 99
It would likewise be impermissible for a state to exclude new residents
from the franchise merely because their political attitudes and probable voting habits differ from those of "long-time" residents.
The third justification for residence requirements stemming from
the "community" doctrine rests on the fact that each state has unique
problems of its own. It is argued that the state has a right to assure
itself that new residents are adequately informed of local issues before

allowing them to vote in presidential elections. Yet the assumption
underlying this argument that knowledge of local issues is essential

for a voter to cast an intelligent and meaningful vote in presidential
elections has been almost unanimously rejected by statistical analysts, 100
politicians, 1 1 and academicians.10 2 Voters simply do not consider local
98 See, e.g., 114 CONG. R C. 15090 (1968), where Senator Montoya stated "[t]rue we
are each a citizen of a State, but we are first each a citizen of the United States."
99 380 U.S. at 94; accord, Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969); Hall v. Beals,
90 S. Ct. 200, 204-5 (1969) (dissenting opinion of Marshall, J.).
100 See, e.g., Gallup Polls of Aug. 4, 1968; Oct. 10, 1968; Oct. 30, 1968. These polls
illustrate the fact that voters are minimally concerned with local issues when considering
presidential candidates. Statistical abstracts of voting behavior reveal that factors such as
party identification, a candidate's image, social differentiation and perception, and
national issues are the primary bases upon which voters make their choice. Local issues
are of little or no importance. See, e.g., A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, W. MLLER & D.
Sroars, ErLcrIONS AND THE POLMTICAL ORaR (1966); A. CAMPBEJL & B. KArrN, THE PEoPLE
ELEcT A PRESIDENT (1952); A. CAMPBELL, G. GURIN & W. MILLER, THE VOTER DECIDES
(1954); P. LAZAsFEL, B. BEREiSON & H. GAUDET, THE PEopLE's CHOIcE (2nd ed. 1948).
101 See, e.g., Hearing on Voting Rights Act Extension Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 3, at 225 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as 1969 Hearings],in which Attorney General John Mitchell, discussing the Voting Rights
Act Amendments of 1969, stated that "[a] residency requirement may be reasonable for
local elections to insure that the new resident has sufficient time to familiarize himself
with local issues. But such requirements have no relevance to presidential elections
because the issues tend to be nationwide in scope and receive nationwide dissemination
by the communications media. The President is the representative of all the people and
all the people should have a reasonable opportunity to vote for him." See, e.g., 115 CONG.
REc. S5176 (daily ed. May 14, 1969) (remarks of Senator Edward Kennedy); 114 CONG. EC.
15090 (1968) (remarks of Senator Montoya); 113 CoNG. REc. 14043 (1967) (remarks of
Congressman Hechler).
102 See, e.g., 1961 Hearings at 472-3 (Statement of Brendan Byrne, Executive Director
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issues in national elections. 103 So while residence requirements might
ensure informed ballots in local elections, no such justification supports
these requirements for presidential elections.
Even if the Supreme Court were to find a compelling state interest
here, the use of residence requirements to achieve the interest is of
questionable constitutionality. By attempting to justify the imposition
of residence requirements on the basis of the state's interest in ensuring
that all voters possess knowledge of local issues, for instance, 10 4 the
state creates two presumptions: (1) most long-time residents possess
such knowledge, and (2) most new residents do not possess such knowledge. The Supreme Court has formulated two somewhat problemati 1 05
doctrines which, when applied to residence requirements for voting,
prohibit the adoption of these presumptions.
First, as discussed earlier in terms of presumptions of non-bona fide
residency,1°6 a state may not exclude a segment of its citizenry from
the franchise because of a remote administrative benefit to the state.
If a state wishes to allow only those citizens who are informed of
local issues to vote, it may do so (the constitutionality of this possibility
is not here in question) by administering tests to all potential voters.
It may not, however, avoid the administrative problems inherent in
the adoption of such tests simply by presuming that most new residents
10 7
would fail and that most long-time residents would pass.
The second objection to the utilization of such presumptions stems
from the proposition that even if a state's exclusion of certain citizens
from the franchise is justified by compelling state interests, the exclusion is unconstitutional unless the least restrictive method of achieving the desired purpose is used. 08 In Kramer v. Union Free School
of the American Heritage Foundation); 1961 Hearings at 851 (Kravitz, Residence Requirements for Voting); Uniform Voting by New Residents in Presidential Elections Act,
Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9C U.L.A. 201-2 (Supp. 1967); Ogul, Residence Requirements as Barriers to Voting in PresidentialElections, 3 MW. J. POL. Sci. 254, 255 (1959).
103 See note 100 supra.
104 While the following discussion is phrased in terms of knowledge of local issues, it
is equally applicable to knowledge of national issues and local attitudes.
105 See notes 107, 112 infra.
106 See text at notes 96-97 supra.
107 This argument is rendered uncertain by the Court's failure to adequately define
"remote." For example, a literal interpretation of the Court's decision in Carrington
might lead to the abolition of age requirements for voting, for the states should factually
determine whether each individual is intelligent, experienced, or informed enough to
vote. Surely the Court did not have the testing of two-year olds in mind when it
formulated this doctrine, but, without limitations, the doctrine could logically be argued
to require just that.
108 See Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 US. 621, 632-3 (1969); Cipriano v.
Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969).
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District0 9 the Court declared unconstitutional a New York statute110
which restricted the franchise for school district elections to those
citizens who, in addition to possessing normal qualifications, also
either (1) owned or leased taxable property within the district or
(2) had children enrolled in the local public schools. The school
district argued that the statute limited the franchise to those "primarily
interested" in school affairs, and that this limitation was necessary to
ensure that voters were informed of complex school matters. The Court,
noting that some residents excluded under the statute might have a
greater interest (albeit indirect) in school elections than some included
under the statute, held that the statute was "not sufficiently tailored
to limiting the franchise to those 'primarily interested' in school affairs to justify the denial of the franchise to [those who did not fulfill
the statute's requirements]."'.'
The Kramer decision is directly applicable to the problem of residence requirements for voting in presidential elections. Since some
new residents may be better informed of local issues than "long-time"
residents, residence requirements, if intended to limit the franchise
to those with knowledge of local issues, do not meet the "exacting
standard of precision [the Court] require[s] of statutes which selectively
l2
distribute the franchise.""
State interests asserted under the "community doctrine" fail to justify the imposition of residence requirements for voting in presidential
elections for two reasons: the asserted interests do not satisfy the compelling state interest doctrine; and the conclusive presumptions created
by such requirements are constitutionally impermissible.
(c) "Administrative reasons." The states by closing voter registration
at some time prior to an election, create a time period in which
administrative tasks, such as processing registration lists and preparing
polling places, may be performed. As recognized by Justice Marshall in
his Hall dissent," 3 the disenfranchisement that results from the closing
109 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
110 N.Y. EDUCAnONAL LAw § 2012 (1953).
211 395 U.S. at 633.
112 Id.; accord, Cipriano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969).
The Court's failure to define "least restrictive method" results in confusion as to the
meaning of the doctrine. It could be argued that the Court is recognizing some form of
mathematical jurisprudence. Under this approach, only the method which could be shown
statistically to exclude the lowest nimber of voters for a given state objective would be
acceptable under the "least restrictive method" rubric. The difficulties with this approach
are self-evident and do not warrant elaboration. On the other hand, if the "least restrictive method" only signifies that method which satisfies five justices of the Supreme Court
as striking a fair balance between the interests of the state in regulating elections and of
the individual in voting in them, the doctrine is hardly a useful one.
113 90 S.Ct. 200, 203 (1969).

The University of Chicago Law -Review

[Vol. 37:359

of registration may be justified by compelling state interests, but this
interest does not justify the imposition of residence requirements which
are significantly longer than the period established in the registration
laws. 114 In fact, it is difficult to conceive of any time-consuming administrative tasks-excepting those normally performed during the
registration periods-which would justify extended residence requirements for those persons recently arrived from other states.
2.

The "Compelling State Interest" Test and the Right to Travel.

The right to travel has been "firmly established and repeatedly recognized" as constitutionally protected."15 The constitutionality of
214 Id. at

205.

In Virginia, for example, there is a one year residence requirement, VA. CODE
ANN. § 24-17 (1969), VA. CONST. § 18 (1968), but registration is not closed until thirty days
before the election, VA. CODE ANN. § 24-74 (1969). The state's need for a thirty day period
in which it may perform administrative tasks does not justify the imposition of a one
year residence requirement. See also IDAno CODE ANN. § 34-808 (1963) (registration doses
three days prior to the election), IDAno CODE ANN. § 84-408 (1963) (sixty day residence
requirement); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 18: 71 et seq. (1969) (registration doses thirty days
prior to the election), LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18: 1393 (1969) (sixty day residence requirement).
It should be noted that the dosing of registration creates de facto residence requirements, since new residents who enter the state after the close of registration are precluded
from voting. While the dosing of registration may be justified by compelling administrative interests, the impact of this closing upon persons who establish residence in the
state after such dosing might not be so justified. The dosing of registration is necessary
because of the large number of registrants the state must deal with. The number of
persons who establish residence after the closing of registration is relatively small, however. While no figures are available as to how many persons would, in fact, be disenfranchised by de facto requirements, the number is certainly far smaller than those
disenfranchised by statutorily imposed residence requirements, which are considerably
longer. Those states which have eliminated their statutorily imposed residence requirements for presidential elections have also eliminated these de facto requirements by
waiving registration requirements for those new residents who enter the state after the
dosing of registration. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3504.02 (1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 26, § 603 (Supp. 1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 6.18 (Supp. 1969). Since no significant
administrative difficulties would result from exempting new residents from registration
requirements, these requirements are probably not necessary to promote compelling
administrative interests, and, as applied to new residents, these requirements may be
unconstitutional.
115 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966). The Guest Court added that "the
right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason, it has been suggested, is
that a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created. In any event, freedom to travel
throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the
Constitution." Id. at 757-8. Accord, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-1 (1969);
see, e.g., Passanger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S.
(6 Wall.) 35 (1869); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869); Ward v. Maryland,
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1871); Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 181,
183-5 (1941) (Douglas & Jackson, J.J., concurring); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958);
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965).
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residence requirements may be challenged 1 0 on the theory that classi-

fications which penalize the exercise of the right to travel are unconstitutional unless necessary to promote compelling state interests.117
In Shapiro v. Thompson,118 the Supreme Court, after holding that
welfare residence requirements were penalties on the right of travel
and that they were not necessary to promote any compelling state interests, 119 declared these requirements unconstitutional under the equal
protection clause. In reaching this decision, the Court noted that:
[w]e imply no view of the validity of

...

residence requirements

determining eligibility to vote ....
Such requirements may promote compelling state interests on the one hand, or, on the other,
may not be penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional right
120
of interstate travel.
Since it has already been argued that residence requirements for voting
in presidential elections are not necessary to promote compelling state
interests, 121 the only question remaining is whether or not these requirements are penalties upon the right to travel.
Unfortunately, the Court has never expressly defined the concept of
"penalty" in this context. As a result, a discussion of whether residence
116 This is a secondary basis for challenging residence requirements for voting in
presidential elections. In his dissent in Hall v. Beals, 90 S. Ct. 200, 203 (1969), Mr. Justice
Marshall, while concluding that residence requirements are unconstitutional as deprivations of the right to vote, does not even consider this subsidiary rationale for their
unconstitutionality.
"37 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, at 634 (1969), in which the Court declared
that "in moving from State to State or to the District of Columbia" a person is exercising
his constitutional right to travel, "and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." Cf. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1968); United States v.
Texas, 384 U.S. 155 (1966); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 463 (1963) and cases cited
therein; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
118 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
119 Four asserted state interests were rejected by the Court as failing to satisfy the
compelling state interest requirement: to facilitate the planning of the welfare budget, to
provide an objective standard of residency, to minimize fraud, and to encourage early
entry of new residents into the labor force.
120 394 U.S. at 638 n.21. In reference to this statement, Chief Justice Warren, dissenting,
stated that:
Nor can I understand the Court's implication, ante, at 638, n.21, that other state
residence requirements such as those employed in determining eligibility to vote do
not present constitutional questions. Despite the fact that in Dreuding v. Devlin,
380 US. 125 (1965), we affirmed an appeal from a three-judge District Court after the
District Court had rejected a constitutional challenge to Maryland's one-year
residence requirement for presidential elections, the rationale employed by the Court
in these appeals would seem to require the opposite conclusion. If a State would
violate equal protection by denying welfare benefits to those who have recently
moved interstate, then it would appear to follow that equal protection would also
be denied by depriving those who have recently moved interstate of the fundamental
right to vote. Id. at 654.
121 See text at notes 90-114 supra.
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requirements for voting penalize the right to travel must be essentially
speculative in nature. The Court, in applying this concept, has ruled
that: (1) the loss of the right to welfare benefits penalizes the right
to travel; 122 (2) the conditioning of the right to vote upon the payment
of a poll tax penalizes the right to vote;' 23 and (3) requiring organizations to disclose their membership lists, when such disclosure might
result in discrimination against such members, penalizes the right to
24

associate.1

In each of these situations there was most likely some degree of
deterrence in that the "penalty" deterred persons from exercising their
constitutionally protected rights. It is doubtful that the loss of the
right to vote due to the existence of residence requirements deters the
exercise of the right to travel. If the Court is equating "penalty" with
"deterrence," it is unlikely that residence requirements for voting
would be considered penalties on the right to travel. On the other
hand, it should be noted that when residence requirements deprive
persons of their constitutionally protected right to vote, in contrast,
for example, to depriving them of welfare benefits, the deprivationat least in constitutional terms-is greater. If the Court looks to the
nature of the deprivation as a determining factor, it is quite possible
that the imposition of residence requirements does constitute a penalty
on the right to travel.
III. CONGRESS

Attempted legislative action concerning residence requirements has
a long history.125 In 1956 Congress officially recommended 126 that the
states adopt "reciprocal arrangements" similar to Connecticut's absentee
122 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
123 See United States v. Texas, 384 U.S. 155 (1966), af'g 252 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Tex.
1966); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
124 See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963);
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
125 As early as 1952 the National Institute of Municipal Clerks advocated federal action
in this area, Ogul, Residence Requirements as Barriers to Voting in PresidentialElections, 3 Mw. J. PoL. ScI. 254, 255 (1959).
126 H.R. Con. Res. 94, 84th Cong., 1st Ses. (1955). This resolution, which was introduced by Rep. Curtis of Massachusetts in 1955, stated that Congress favored, and
recommended to the states, the passage of reciprocal arrangements between the states
which would allow a citizen to vote in his state of prior residence until he is qualified
in his new state. This resolution was adopted in 1956.
In 1954, Rep. Curtis introduced H.R. Con. Res. 218, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1954),
proposing that Congress recommend to the states immediate enactment of appropriate
legislation to enable a person to vote for federal officials when such persons would be
eligible to vote but for residence requirements. This resolution was passed by the House,
but was not reported from committee in the Senate.
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approach.2 7 The ineffectiveness 2 8 of this indirect action led Congress
to consider two possible direct solutions to the problem: the adoption
of a constitutional amendment and the passage of direct federal legislation.
A. Proposalsfor a ConstitutionalAmendment.
The states' power 129 to impose residence requirements for voting can
be limited by constitutional amendment. Since 1961,130 over twentyfive constitutional amendments of this type have been proposed in Congress. The most popular form of amendment, following the Wisconsin
approach, 131 would restrict residence requirements to a stated maximum
period. 13 2 A second group of proposals follow the Connecticut approach, 133 permitting ex-residents to vote by absentee ballot until they
are qualified in their new state of residence. 134 A third proposal' 35
couples a maximum requirement with an equally long absentee provision and is more desirable than either of the above approaches, for it
eliminates disenfrachisement while subjecting only a limited number
of movers to the burdensome absentee procedures. All these proposals
13
are limited to protecting only interstate movers.
The absentee approach is discussed in the text at notes 22-23 supra.
128 Only nine states have adopted the absentee method, see notes 22-23 supra.
129 This power is derived from article II, section 1 of the Constitution. See note 18
supra.
130 Prior to 1961, proposals for such an amendment were rare. See S.J. Res. 51, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1958); H.RJ. Res. 524, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). The closeness of the
1960 election and the large numbers of citizens disenfranchised in it, however, effectively
dramatized the need for federal intervention in this area, see notes 6-7 supra.
131 See text at notes 31-36 supra.
132 See, e.g., SJ. Res. 59, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (thirty day maximum requirement)
(sponsored by twenty-nine senators); H.R.J. Res. 550, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (thirty
day maximum requirement); H.R.J. Res. 539, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (thirty day
maximum); SJ. Res. 174, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1968) (thirty day maximum); S.J. Res. 5,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (sponsored by eight senators) (thirty day maximum); H.R.J.
Res. 238, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) (ninety day maximum); SJ. Res. 90, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1961) (ninety day maximum); SJ. Res. 128, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) (ninety day
maximum, but all those who would have been qualified to vote in their old state if they
had not moved are allowed to vote immediately).
133 See text at notes 22-30 supra.
134 See, e.g., SJ. Res. 93, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R.J. Res. 580, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967); H.RJ. Res. 981, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1964). In addition, several concurrent
resolutions have been proposed recommending that the states adopt the absentee approach,
see, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 347, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. Con. Res. 286, 88th Cong.,
2nd Sess. (1964).
135 See SJ. Res. 14, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
130 The question of residence requirements arose in conjunction with a bill recently
passed by the House proposing a constitutional amendment eliminating the Electoral
College and replacing it with direct election of the President and Vice-President. H.RJ.
Res. 681, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). This amendment, in pertinent part, said: "The electors
127
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Proposalsfor DirectFederalLegislation.

Congressional action was limited to proposals for constitutional
amendments and concurrent resolutions until 1966. It was generally
agreed, until that time, that Congress had no power to legislate under

the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to eliminate
13 7
or restrict the imposition of residence requirements for voting. '
Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment declares that ".... Congress

shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court had interpreted

this amendment as having given Congress no independent authority
to interpret the substantive provisions of the fourteenth amendment.

88

of President and Vice-President in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature, except that for electors of President and Vice-President the legislature of any State may prescribe less restrictive residence
qualifications, and for electors of President and Vice-President the Congress may establish
uniform residence qualifications." Attempts to require the adoption of absentee procedures for those who had moved interstate were rejected, 115 CONG. REC. H7784 (daily ed.
Sept. 11, 1969); and a proposal to amend this clause to state that Congress will establish
uniform residence requirements was rejected because it would be "suicidal" and would
make a controversial amendment even more difficult to pass. 115 CONG. REc. H8117
(daily ed. Sept. 18, 1969).
While it is true that the adoption of an amendment instituting the direct election of
the President will probably be difficult to pass, there is little justification whatever for
allowing the states to retain their control over voter qualifications for presidential elections once the Electoral College is abolished. Under the direct popular election system,
all voting requirements should be uniform, and, as to residence requirements, there is no
reason why any person should be deprived of his right to vote for President merely
because he has changed his place of residence.
137 See, e.g., 1961 Hearings at 36, 855; Schmidhauser, Residency Requirements for
Voting and the Tensions of a Mobile Society, 61 MICH. L. REv. 823, 834 (1963).
Prior to 1966 Congress might have been able to legislate with regard to residence
requirements on the basis of the commerce clause. The Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutionality of congressional enactments relating to the movement of persons across
state lines on this basis, see, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). However, legislation based on
the commerce clause would necessarily be limited to restricting state residence requirements. Local requirements could not be regulated since they do not affect interstate
commerce.
138 See generally Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morgantic Marriage, 1969 Sup. Cr.
R-Ev. 81. The background of the equal protection clause makes it dear that the draftsmen
of the fourteenth amendment regarded Congress as the primary organ for its enforcement.
See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459, in which Congressman Stevens stated
that the amendment "allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States .... ;
R. HARMS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALrrY 53 (1960); J. TENBRoEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 205-7
(1965); Comment, Equal Protection Clause-CongressionalPower of Initial Determination,
20 RuTrEs L. lFv. 827, 828 (1966). The Reconstruction Congress believed that the
enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment had enlarged congressional power by
enabling Congress to by-pass state governments and act directly to protect the civil rights
of all citizens. Acting under this belief, Congress enacted five acts pertaining to civil
rights from 1866 to 1875: The Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 STAT. 335 (1875); The Ku
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As a result, congressional legislation based on the enforcement clause
became virtually non-existent. These cases remained the law until 1966
when the Court rejected this narrow view of section 5 and replaced
it with a broader construction. 39
In Katzenbach v. Morgan,'40 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,141 which
provided that no person who had completed the sixth grade in any
Puerto Rican school, in which the language of instruction was other
than English, should be denied the right to vote in any election
because of his inability to read or write English. The appellees argued
that section 4(e) exceeded congressional power because there had been
no prior judicial determination of a violation of equal protection upon
1 42
which to base this section 5 legislation.

The Court ruled that section 5 was a positive grant of power authorizKlux Klan Act, 17 STAT. 13 (1871); The Enforcement Act, 16 STAT. 433 (1871); The
Enforcement Act, 16 STAT. 140 (1870); The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 STAT. 27 (1866).
Although initial judicial interpretation of the enforcement clause seemed to ratify this
belief, see United States v. Hall, 26 Fed. Cas. 79 (No. 15282) (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1870), subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court retreated to a more conservative interpretation.
The Court's restriction of congressional power under the enforcement clause began
with its decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1878), which held that
"a citizenship of the United States, and a citizenship of a State, . . .are distinct from
each other .. " Id. at 74. The Court then declared that the fourteenth amendment
protected only rights granted by United States citizenship. Although the Court in the
Slaughterhouse Cases was dealing with the privileges and immunities clause, two subsequent decisions, United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) and United States v.
Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882), made it clear that affirmative enforcement of equal protection
was solely within the domain of the state governments. In the Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883), the Court added the requirement of state action and declared that the
only power granted to Congress by section five of the fourteenth amendment was to
"adopt appropriate legislation for correcting the effects of such prohibited State laws and
State acts.. " Id. at 11. Thus, by 1882 it was clear that Congress could only legislate to
correct recognized violations of the equal protection clause. It could not, by its own
determination, create new violations. See Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 14 (1906);
United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 638 (1882); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880);
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-6 (1880); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1880); see generally Comment, Equal Protection Clause-CongressionalPower of Initial

Determination, 20 RuTGEas L. Rnv. 827 (1966) and authorities cited therein.
139 This reversal was first hinted at by Justice Black in his dissenting opinion in
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 883 U.S. 663 (1966), in which he stated that he had
"no doubt that Congress had the power under § 5 [of the fourteenth amendment] to pass
legislation to abolish the poll tax ... if it believes that the poll tax is being used as a
device to deny voters of equal protection of the law." Id. at 679. In United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), Justice Brennan, dissenting in part, stated that a majority of
the Court rejected the contention that congressional power under section five was limited
to "correcting the effects of prohibited state laws." Id. at 783.
140 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
141 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)(e) (Supp. I, 1964).
142 384 U.S. at 648.
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ing Congress to exercise its discretion as to whether and what legislation
is needed to secure the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment. 143 In
determining whether the challenged statute constituted "appropriate
legislation," as required by section 5, the Court considered three
questions: may the enactment be regarded as an enforcement of the
equal protection clause; is the enactment "plainly adapted to that
end"; and, is it not prohibited by, but consistent with, the letter and
spirit of the Constitution? 144 Proposed federal legislation concerning
residence requirements should be measured against these same standards.
In answering the first question, the Morgan Court considered two
factors. First, Congress had expressly declared that section 4(e) was
enacted to secure fourteenth amendment rights; the same declarations
are present in residence requirement legislation. 4 5 More importantly,
the Court seemed to judge the nature of the deprivation of the right
to vote and conclude that it might well be subsumed under the equal
protection clause; 146 the parallel with the residence requirement legislation is striking.
In answering the second question, whether the legislation was "plainly
adapted" to enforce the equal protection clause, the Court viewed the
statute on two levels. First, the Court noted that competing state and
individual interests had to be balanced against one another in determining when federal intervention was appropriate. With regard to this
balancing process, the Court stated:
[i]t was for Congress, as the branch that made this judgment, to
assess and weigh the various conflicting considerations ....
It is
not for us to review the congressional resolution of these factors.
Id.
Id. at 651.
For example, the Residency Voting Act of 1967, proposed by President Johnson,
explicitly declared that: "Sec. 2 The Congress hereby declares that to enhance the right
under the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of citizens who change their
residence to enjoy equal access to the right to vote in the election for President and
Vice President of the United States . . . it is necessary to prohibit the States from conditioning the right to vote on the fulfillment of unfair requirements of residence and
registration." See H.R. 10949, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); H.R. 12133, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967); H.R. 12255, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967); H.R. 12635, 90th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1967).
In some situations the text of the proposed bill does not explicitly declare that it is
intended as an enforcement of the equal protection clause. In such situations, however,
the background of the bill makes it dear that it is so intended. See, e.g., 1969 Hearings
at 277-8, in which Attorney General Mitchell states that the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1969 (H.R. 12695, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S. 2507, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969))
is intended as an enforcement of the fourteenth amendment.
146 384 US. 641, 652.
143

144
3.45
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It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the
147
Congress might resolve the conflict as it did.

A congressional decision to restrict the imposition of residence requirements for voting rests upon such a reasonable balancing of interests.
Factors such as increased mobility,148 the disenfranchisement caused by

residence requirements, 4 9 the importance of the right to vote, 5 ° and
the nonuniformity of state action 151 can, at the very least, rationally
be thought to outweigh the state interests in preventing fraud, 15 2 ensuring that new residents are members of the community, 5 3 and handling
the administrative problems inherent in conducting an election. 154
At a second level, the Court upheld Congress' power to decide that
New York's English literacy requirement created an invidious discrimination, 155 and it declared that such a decision is valid if the Court
can perceive a basis on which the judgment was made. 156 Given the constitutionally protected nature of the right of vote,'157 and the fact that
residence requirements are not necessary to promote any compelling
state interests, 158 Congress could reasonably decide that residence requirements create an invidious discrimination.
The third question, whether the challenged statute is consistent with
the letter and spirit of the Constitution, poses some difficulties. There
are four types of legislation which Congress could enact with regard
to residence requirements for voting in presidential elections: legislation establishing a maximum permissible residence requirement; legislation requiring the states to allow ex-residents to vote absentee if they
are prohibited from voting in their new place of residence by residence
requirements; legislation combining a maximum permissible requirement with absentee provisions; and legislation eliminating residence
requirements entirely. The first and third alternatives involve the
147
148

Id. at 653.
See note 10 supra.

149 See notes 7, 9 supra.
150 See note 81 supra.
151 See Tables I and II supra.
152 See text at notes 89-94 supra.
153 See text at notes 95-112 supra.
154 See text at notes 1134 supra.
155 The Court declared that "[t]rue, the statute [§ 4(e)] precludes, for a certain class,
disenfranchisement and thus limits the States' choice of means of satisfying a purported
state interest. But our cases have held that the States can be required to tailor carefully
the means of satisfying a legitimate state interest when fundamental liberties and rights
are threatened .... and Congress is free to apply the same principle in the exercise of its
powers." 384 U.S. at 655, n.15 (emphasis added).
156 384 U.S. at 656.
157 See text at note 81 supra.
158 See text at notes 89-114 supra.
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adoption of a maximum permissible requirement and would, in effect,
authorize the states to adopt requirements of shorter duration than the
maximum. Since, as seen above,'6 9 the constitutionality of any residence
requirement for voting in presidential elections is dubious, the adoption of a maximum requirement might well have the effect of authorizing the states to violate the equal protection clause. In Shapiro v.
Thompson 6 0 it was argued that section 402(b) of the Social Security
Act of 1935161 authorized the imposition of one year residence requirements for receiving welfare benefits. The Court declared that if section
402(b) did authorize such requirements it was unconstitutional, for
"Congress may not authorize the States to violate the Equal Protection
clause."' 62 Hence, a federal enactment permitting a maximum residence
requirement might not be consistent with "the letter of the Constitution."163
However, neither of the two remaining possible enactments, the
adoption of a complete absentee system and the complete elimination
of residence requirements for voting in presidential elections, authorizes
the states to adopt unconstitutional residence requirements.'6 4 Both
of these alternatives are consistent with "the letter and spirit of the
Constitution," and are, therefore, permissible under the Morgan
standard. 165
159 See text at notes 64-124 supra.

160 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
161 42 U.S.C. § 602(b).
162

394 U.S. at 641.

A related yet distinguishable problem confronted the Court in Morgan. There the
appellees claimed that § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act worked an invidious discrimination
in that it was not applicable to people educated in schools beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. The Court rejected this contention, noting that "reform
may take one step at a time . . . ," and that a reasonable limitation on the scope of
applicability of a reform measure was not prohibited by the Constitution. Id. at 656-7.
Such reasoning, however, is not applicable to a statute establishing a maximum residence
requirement. Section 4(e) merely prohibited a certain type of literacy test and was silent
as to all others, while a statute establishing a maximum residence requirement authorizes
the adoption of requirements of shorter duration than the maximum. Moreover, even if
§ 4(e) were interpreted as authorizing other types of literacy tests, such an authorization
would not be unconstitutional, since such tests are generally constitutionally permissible.
See, e.g., Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd. of Elections, 860 U.S. 45 (1959).
164 A statute requiring the states to adopt absentee procedures, while recognizing the
existence of residence requirements for voting in presidential elections, cannot be said to
authorize their imposition. Such a statute neither prohibits nor permits the imposition
of such requirements, it merely provides a remedy.
165 It should be noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Dreuding v. Devlin, 880
U.S. 125 (1965), holding that residence requirements for voting are not violative of the
equal protection clause, did not foreclose Congress' right to restrict the imposition of
these requirements on the basis of the equal protection clause. The Morgan Court confronted this problem with regard to its decision in Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd.
163

1970]

Residence Requirements for PresidentialElections

Since Morgan there have been over twenty-five proposals for federal
legislation in this area. These proposals are of primarily two types. The
first type calls for the establishment of September first as the maximum
permissible residence requirement for voting in presidential elections. 166
This approach offers protection neither to intrastate movers nor to
interstate movers who changed their residence after September first.
The second approach aims not only at establishing September first as
the maximum requirement, but also at allowing anyone moving interstate after September first to vote absentee in the state from which he
had moved.167 None of these proposals has been reported from committee. The most comprehensive bill16s yet proposed, however, has already
passed the House,169 and is presently under consideration in the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary. This bill, which has the support of the
Nixon administration, would establish September first as the maximum
residence requirement at both the state and local levels, and would
permit absentee voting for persons who move after that date.
Two further approaches are available to Congress which might comport more closely with the standards for appropriate legislation to
enforce the equal protection clause. 170 First, Congress may require that
all states provide absentee ballotting privileges to all citizens who have
of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), which held that states may require literacy tests if they
are applied in a non-discriminatory manner. The Morgan Court ruled that this decision
was "inapposite" because "Lassiter did not present the question before us here: without
regard to whether the judiciary would find that the Equal Protection Clause itself
nullifies New York's English literacy requirement as so applied, could Congress prohibit
the enforcement of the state law by legislating under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment?
In answering this question, our task is limited to determining whether such legislation is,
as required by § 5, appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause."
394 US. at 649-50. Thus, the Court's decision in Dreduing does not prevent Congress from
making its own determination, if reasonable, as to the constitutionality of residence
requirements for voting.
166 See, e.g., S. 1881, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967); H.R. 10949, 90th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1967); H.R. 12133, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967); H.R. 12255, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967);
H.R. 12635, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967); S. 2165, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (proposed
thirty day maximum) (co-sponsored by twenty-seven senators).
167 See, e.g., H.R. 1293, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 3799, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969); H.R. 4160, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969) (co-sponsored by twenty-two congressmen);
H.R. 4261, 91st Cong., ist Sess. (1969); H.R. 4793, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 4794,
91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969); H.R. 5557, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 5961, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 5979, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969); H.R. 6512, 91st Cong., Ist Sess.
(1969); H.R. 6177, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969); H.R. 7310, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969); H.R.
7429, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 9530, 91st Cong., 1st Seas. (1969); S.654, 91st C6ng.,
Ist Sess. (1969).
168 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1969 § 2; H.R. 12695, 91st Cong., Ist Seas. (1969);
S.2507, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
169 The bill passed the House by a vote of 234 to 179. 115 CoNG. RFc. H12184-5 (daily
ed. Dec. 11, 1969).
170 See text at notes 159-63 supra.
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changed their place of residence (either interstate or intrastate) and who,
as a result of this move, cannot meet the residence requirements of
their new place of residence.17 1 While such an enactment would eliminate the disenfranchisement caused by residence requirements, it
would -be subject to the many problems previously discussed with
regard to the adoption of such an absentee approach. 7 2
The most desirable form of congressional action would be the adoption of a statute abolishing all residence requirements for voting in
presidential elections. Such a statute would avoid the constitutional
objections which would arise with regard to a statute establishing a
maximum requirement, would avoid the problems inherent in a
complete absentee approach, would provide the states with sufficient
time to handle administrative difficulties and prevent fraud through
their registration laws, and would eliminate all disenfranchisement due
to the imposition of residence requirements for voting in presidential
elections. 173
CONCLUSION

Residence requirements for voting in presidential elections have
deprived millions of Americans of their constitutionally protected right
to vote for President and Vice-President of the United States. The
states have moved slowly and unevenly in dealing with this problem,
and the solution will have to be found at the national level. While
recent Supreme Court decisions seem to indicate that the Court will
soon strike down these requirements as unconstitutional, the adoption
of a federal statute completely abolishing residence requirements for
voting in presidential elections would be the swiftest, most equitable,
and most efficient method of eliminating the unnecessary disenfranchisement that these requirements will otherwise cause in future presidential
elections.
171 See, e.g., H.R. 8602, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (permitting absentee ballot for one
year after moving).
172 See text at notes 24-30 supra.
-173 In addition, Congress may eliminate the disenfranchising effects of the de facto
residence requirements created by registration laws by either exempting new residents
from registration requirements, or by allowing persons who enter a state or political subdivision after the dosing of registration to vote in their prior place of residence by
absentee ballot. See note 114 supra.

